

Approved For Release 2001/04/04 : CIA-RDP80-01443R000300150003-1

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NSA 25X1A



NSA, DOS, & USAF Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

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Since then the Air Force has received the US radar plot of the RB-29. This is shown in yellow and would place the RB-29 at 1148 hours at approximately 17 nautical miles southwest of Akiyuri (yellow hourglass).

In reconstructing their mission (black line), surviving RB-29 crew members state they were approximately 15 nautical miles west-southwest of Akiyuri when attacked at 1148 hours (black hourglass).

SUPPORTING DATA APPENDED

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INDEX OF SUPPORTING MATERIAL

1. Soviet and US radars
2. "MacArthur Line"--origin and status
3. USAF evaluation of positional data
4. US note to Soviets
5. Soviet reply
6. US incident investigation

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SOVIET AND US RADARS

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According to D/I USAF Air Intelligence Study 2-22⁰, Soviet early warning and aircraft control radars located within range of incident include:

-KUNASHIRA JIMA	43 38 N - 145 30 E
TOMARIMURA	43 48 N - 145 30 E
-TENNI	44 45 N - 147 36 E
-AKiyuri Shima	43 22 N - 146 00 E

According to a USAF radar intelligence report dated 26 August the following sites were within range of the incident:

-WAKKANAI	45 27 N - 141 39 E
-NEMURO	43 21 N - 145 37 E
-ABASHIRI	44 05 N - 144 13 E
-OKUSHIRI SHIMA	42 09 N - 139 26 E
-RUMOI	43 57 N - 141 40 E
-ERIMO SAKI	41 56 N - 143 13 E

/General White was inclined to believe the "US Radar Tracks"

(back up No. 3) originated from WAKKANAI.⁷

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"MacARTHUR LINE"--ORIGIN AND STATUS

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
SOVIET UNION

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✓ 1.  B-29 over waters claimed by USSR:

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
 the American B-29 which crashed on northeastern Hokkaido about noon on 7 November was attacked by MIG's above waters over which the USSR asserts jurisdiction off the Soviet-occupied Habomai islands (see map, p. 5).

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 apparently in response to the B-29's presence in the area. Six flights of MIG's were involved.

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Comment: There is no line of demarcation between Japan and the Habomais which has been explicitly agreed upon by the United States and Japan on the one hand and the USSR on the other.

Both sides, on the other hand, have tacitly recognized the so-called "MacArthur line" de facto and

9 Nov 54

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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for certain purposes. This was a line which General MacArthur drew when he was SCAP and which delimited the waters within which the Japanese were allowed to fish.

The line ran three miles off the northern coast of the Nemuro peninsula, passed through the Goyomai strait approximately one mile from the Japanese coast and extended southeast from there through and beyond the scene of the 7 November incident. General MacArthur's order drawing this line was rescinded by General Ridgway, MacArthur's successor as SCAP, in April, 1952.

The Soviets have never expressly recognized the "MacArthur line." They have, however, consistently patrolled the line with surface vessels and have seized Japanese fishing boats which have ventured beyond the line.

There is also some reason to believe that the USSR may tacitly accept the line as the air frontier in this area. Soviet fighter planes regularly patrol the line, and the attack of 7 November occurred on the Soviet side of the line. This is the second incident, moreover, in which Soviet fighters have attacked an American plane on the Soviet side of the line. The first attack occurred on 7 October 1952 within a few miles of the latest incident.

The Soviet response to American patrol and reconnaissance flights in the Far East has been consistently aggressive during the past six months.

The USSR claims the Habomais on the grounds that they constitute a part of the Kurils and that the Yalta agreement awarded all the Kurils to the Soviet Union. The United States and Japan deny that the Habomais are a part of the Kurils and Washington and Tokyo have never recognized de jure the Soviet claim to the Habomais. [REDACTED]

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USAF EVALUATION OF POSITIONAL DATA

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
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

AFOIN-2A2

12 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. H. D. Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency

In accordance with instructions of Maj. Gen. J. A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, USAF, the attached information is submitted relative to the incident involving a USAF RB-29 off Hokkaido Island on 7 November. This information was requested at a conference between Gen. Twining and Mr. Dulles on 10 November.


JOHN E. BRIDGE
Lt Colonel, USAF
Directorate of Intelligence

2 Incls

1. COMFEAF Cable
A-COMDR 9808
2. COMFEAF Cable,
DO-0576 TS - 4 pgs

When incl(s) No. 1 and 2
is/are withdrawn (or not attached),
the Top Secret classification
of this correspondence will be down-
graded to Confidential in
accordance with Per 25e, AFR 205-1.

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(Following is the text of a cable from COMFEAF to CS/USAF, DO 0576,
10 Nov 54)

4 - 43 77

"URMSG RL 972. The following information is submitted. This
message in 9 parts.

"Part 1. The flight line for the photo mapping flight was at
17,000 feet, west to east, along latitude 43 15 40N ending at 43 15 40N -
145 37 50E.

"Part 2. The following is the estimate of the RB-29 crew actual
track at completion of photo flight line: at approximately 43 15 40N -
145 40 00E a turn to the south was begun which took the aircraft just
to the east of Tasumino-se reef, 43 14 55N - 145 42 10E. This turn
was continued to a heading of approximately 240 degrees. After fly-
ing straight and level for a short period of time, the aircraft comman-
der began a turn to the east and rolled out on a magnetic heading of
0 degrees. On this heading the reef mentioned above was directly
ahead of the aircraft. At no time during these turns was the aircraft
farther east than 145 43 50. The RB-29 was at 43 12 00N - 145 43 00E
when the unfriendly aircraft were first sighted. At that time an imme-
diate turn to the west was begun, maintaining 17,000 feet altitude.
At 43 14 00N - 145 40 00E the unfriendly aircraft began their firing
passes. The pilot estimates these firing passes ceased at 43 13 00N -
145 38 00E. When the first pass was made the pilot began an
immediate letdown and the bailout order was given at 11,000 feet at

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Cable, COMFEAF DO 0576 10 Nov 54 cont'd:

43 13 20N-145 31 40E. The aircraft commander bailed out at 8,500 feet at 43 13 15N - 145 25 20E.

"Part 3. The radar plots of the RB-29 are as follows:

0234Z	43 15N - 145 02E
0236Z	43 09N - 145 17E
0238Z	43 16N - 145 31E
0240Z	43 16N - 145 40E
02120242Z	43 16N - 145 50E
0246Z	43 05N - 145 54E
0247Z	43 08N - 145 56E
0248Z	43 13N - 145 54E
0249Z	43 21N - 145 46E
0253Z	43 16N - 145 32E

"Part 4. The radar plots of the unfriendly fighters are as follows:

0143Z	44 00N - 145 38E
0200Z	43 38N - 146 15E
0214Z	43 37N - 146 09E
0239Z	43 40N - 145 47E
0242Z	43 43N - 146 01E
0244Z	43 12N - 146 01E
0246Z	43 08N - 146 03E
0247Z	43 05N - 146 11E
0248Z	43 13N - 146 01E
0249Z	43 16N - 146 00E
0251Z	43 20N - 145 53E
0254Z	43 26N - 146 08E
0256Z	43 28N - 146 07E
0259Z	43 31N - 145 59E
0301Z	43 31N - 146 07E
0305Z	43 32N - 145 53E
0307Z	43 58N - 145 49E

"Part 5. It is the opinion of this headquarters that the pilot and crew's statement of aircraft position during the turn is more accurate than the radar plots for the following reasons: A. To fly a slight

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Page 2 of 4 pages.

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Cable, COMFEAF DO 0576 10 Nov 54 cont'd:

line for a photo mapping mission the aircraft must maintain the desired track very accurately. To accomplish this, four members of the crew coordinate. These members are the aircraft commander, photo operator, radar operator and the navigator.

"B. The crew that flew this mission has flown ten consecutive mapping missions with no requirement of re-run.

"C. On this particular flight, the radar operator in the aircraft was using Tasumino-se Reef on his radar scope as a reference point during the turn.

"D. The pilot, radar operator and navigator were extremely intent upon knowing their exact position in order to permit them to continue north to start a new flight strip which ran along 43 18 40N latitude.

"E. The crew of the RB-29 were not under stress until after they had turned west when unfriendly aircraft were sighted.

"F. The aircraft commander and crew were well briefed on the sensitivity of the area into which they were flying.

"Part 5. The radar plots are not considered as accurate as the crew's estimated positions for the following reasons:

"A. Two radar sites were plotting the RB-29 and this information was passed to the ADOC at Misawa, Japan, and then passed

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Cable COMFEAF DO 0576 10 Nov 54 cont'd:

to COC, 5AF, Nagoya Japan. The plots of the two radar sites were averaged. There is also a possibility of error in transmission of these plots to the ADOC. and COC.

"B. The radar plot at 43 09 00N - 145 17 00E is considered in error in that the RB-29 was flying a flight line as accurately as possible at that time. The weather in the area could not conceivably permit an error of approximately 7 nautical miles while flying this flight path.

"C. The radar plots of the RB-29 and the unfriendly aircraft were, at no time, closer than 5 nautical miles.

"Part 7. It is desired to point out that neither the crew position report nor the radar plots indicate that the RB-29 violated Russian territory at any time.

"Part 8. This command has appointed a senior officer to make a thorough investigation of this incident and to include exact radar plots of each site of both the RB-29 and the unfriendly aircraft.

"Part 9. American Embassy, Tokyo, requests this message be passed to State Department by priority. "

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(Following is the text of a Limited Distribution cable, Twining from Partridge, #A-COMDR 9808, 8 Nov 54)

"TOO 080618Z. This is additional information on B-29 incident of 7 November. Aircraft was engaged in mission over Eastern Hokkaido for mapping purposes. Airplane had completed west to east strip at 17,000 feet and then when about 14 miles offshore at point 43°07'30"N - 145°55'E at 1146 local time started right turn to south to start on next strip which was to be flown from east to west. As airplane was completing turn over point 43°05'N - 145°51'E it was attacked by two USSR jet fighters at 1147 local time. Airplane did not repeat not overfly USSR territory nor did it approach nearest Russian-held Japanese island (Akikura Shima) closer than 14 miles according to accounts related by crew and confirmed by our own ground radar plots. Weather was clear and crew was not only experienced but well briefed as to mission to be flown. Enemy attack was initiated without any preliminary warning by enemy fighters and no repeat no attempt was made by enemy to signal to B-29. Crew of photo plane observed two fighters just before first of two firing passes started. At no repeat no time did our gunner fire on enemy aircraft although they have instructions to do so under the circumstances which existed. Crew's reason for failure to return fire is not known to me and will be furnished in supplementary wire after further interrogation. Of 11 men aboard, 10 received minor or no injury; 11th man jumped first and was apparently injured when he collided with cliff

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Cable, COMFEAF A-COMDR 9808 8 Nov 54 cont'd:

at water's edge. It would appear that he then rolled into water and drowned about 10 feet offshore. Spots where crew landed after bailout extended northwest from town of Ochiishi in direction of Kennebetsu, with aircraft commander last to leave airplane, reaching ground at Betsuoga. Since there was a strong wind aloft from west above 3,000 feet and since bailout took place above 8,500 feet, it is obvious that airplane was far inside Japan territory at time bailout started. Airplane continued in approximate straight line and crashed in flames at 43°25'N - 144°55'E. Crew reports and location of landing points on ground confirms that crew discipline was excellent and that departure from aircraft was made quickly and in orderly manner. Same photo mapping mission B-29 was carrying out on 7th was accomplished today, 8 Nov, by another B-29 with fighter escort without repeat without incident.

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US NOTE TO SOVIETS

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OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

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SENT TO: Amembassy MOSCOW
Rptd. Amembassy TOKYO

NIACT 347
NIACT 964

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Origin
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OSD
ARMY
AIR
NAVY

Re Tokyo's 1121, repeated Moscow 345.

You are requested deliver following note Soviet
Foreign Ministry by messenger:

"US Government has been informed that a US B-29 type
aircraft was shot down over Japanese territory in the Hokkaido ~~XX~~
area on November 7 by two Soviet MIG-type aircraft.

"US Government strongly protests this action. It will
expect Soviet Government to make all such moral and material
reparations as lies within its power.

"US Government will communicate further with Soviet
Government when the facts regarding human and material losses ~~XX~~
are more fully known."

FYI Press here being told we are protesting and note will
be released on delivery (Moscow requested confirm). Press
also being given facts re incident contained Tokyo's 1121 with
caution these based on preliminary report.

DULLES

Drafted by:
EUR:RLThurston

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

Defense-General Ridgway

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SOVIET REPLY



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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

24-N

Action

EUR

Info

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FE

UOC

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OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

Control: 3195

Rec'd: November 7, 1954
5:09 p.m.

FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 715, November 7, 11 p.m.

NIACT

Following is translation of note Number 93/OSA received 2140 hours November 7 concerning incident DEPTELS 345 and 346.

QUOTE

Government of USSR considers it necessary to state following to Government of USA.

In accordance with established facts on November 7 this year at 1:20 p.m. local time (12:41 p.m. Vladivostok time) four-motored military airplane of B-29 type with identifying marks of military air forces of US violated state boundary of Soviet Union in region of island Tanfilyev* (Kurile islands) and continued to penetrate into air space of USSR in direction of this island.

At time of its flight over island of Hanfilev* American airplane was met by two Soviet fighters with purpose of indicating to it that it was within limits of boundaries of USSR and of proposing that it immediately leave air space of Soviet Union. Upon approach of Soviet fighters American airplane mentioned opened fire on them. In connection with this unprovoked action by American airplane-violator Soviet airplanes were forced to open answering fire, after which American airplane left air space of Soviet Union in southwesterly direction.

Soviet Government decisively protests to Government of US this gross violation by American military airplane of Soviet boundary.

This is new instance of violation by American military airplanes of state boundary of Soviet Union. Soviet Government brought attention of Government of US to similar instances of violation, in particular in its notes of September 5 and 8 of this year.

Soviet Government notes with regret that instances of violation of Soviet boundary by American military airplanes which occurred earlier involved in no way justified losses (zhertvy) as was indicated in relevant notes of Government of US.

/Soviet

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-2-#715, November 7, 11 p.m., from Moscow

Soviet Government considers that taking of measures for prevention in future of violations by American airplanes of Soviet state boundary would be in interests both of Soviet Union and of USA and expects that to this end appropriate instructions will be given by Government of US to command of American military air forces.

UNQUOTE

BOHLEN

EL/8

* As received.

Note: Passed OSD, Army, Navy, Air and Tokyo 5:45 p.m. 11/7/54 NPL

Mr. Hella (SS-R), Mr. Crawford (EUR) notified 5:30 p.m. 11/7/54

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US INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

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